Rohingya crisis: The maze of repatriation

The Rohingya crisis currently stands as the greatest threat to Bangladesh’s national security and sovereignty. Recently, it has been further complicated by debates over transit corridors and incidents of push-in operations where India has forcibly sent some registered Rohingyas into Bangladesh. In March, UN Secretary-General António Guterres and Bangladesh’s interim government’s Chief Adviser Dr Muhammad Yunus visited Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar and gave hopeful messages about repatriating the Rohingyas to their homeland in Rakhine. There were reports that as many as 180,000 Rohingyas might be repatriated to Myanmar. However, those hopes quickly proved unrealistic. Moreover, since the interim government took charge nine months ago, at least 100,000 new Rohingyas have entered Bangladesh. As a result, Bangladesh's burden is increasing, and the issue of Rohingya repatriation is becoming entangled in a complex web of regional and international politics, with no immediate resolution in sight.

History of the Rohingya crisis
History shows that during the 1942 genocide, more than 500,000 Rohingyas fled to what was then East Bengal—present-day Bangladesh—seeking refuge in areas of Cox's Bazar and Bandarban. In 1958, under government-supported violence by Magh soldiers and local Magh communities, thousands more fled to Bangladesh. Later, high-level talks between East Pakistan and the Burmese government resulted in the repatriation of many refugees.

Between 1948 and 1978, the Burmese government carried out around 14 major military operations in the Arakan (Rakhine) region, including BTF Operation (1948), Combined Immigration and Army Operation (1955), Shiu Kai Operation (1966), Nagazinka Operation (1967–68), Myat Mon Operation (1969–71), Seik Operation (1974), and Dragon King Operation (1978).

According to a 2004 Amnesty report, the Dragon King Operation by the Myanmar military led to over 200,000 Rohingyas fleeing to Bangladesh in 1978. Due to international pressure, Myanmar agreed to take back some refugees, but repression continued, and Rohingyas kept fleeing. In 1991–92, another 250,000 fled to Bangladesh.

After Bangladesh's independence, in 1974, about 10,000 Rohingyas again fled to Bangladesh. Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman issued a stern message to Burma, forcing them to take back the refugees. In 2012, about 125,000 Rohingyas were displaced in Rakhine again. Over 700,000 Rohingyas still live there, now facing threats not just from the Myanmar government but from the Arakan Army, which has been demanding autonomy since 2009 and now controls large parts of Rakhine, including parts of the Bangladesh–Myanmar border.

The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) of Myanmar does not recognize Rohingyas as a distinct ethnic group among the country's 135 national races. The erasure of the historical name “Arakan” and its replacement with “Rakhine State” reflects the intent to eliminate the Rohingya identity and promote Rakhine identity.

The Myanmar government has confiscated Rohingya land and forcibly evicted them from their homes without compensation. These lands have been resettled with other ethnic groups.

Why is Bangladesh the innocent victim
Bangladesh’s districts of Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban are the closest to Rakhine. Rohingyas typically enter Bangladesh through three routes: crossing the Naf River, traveling by boat to Shah Porir Dwip near Teknaf, or through hilly terrain into areas like Ghumdhum, Baisfari, and Ruma in Bandarban’s Naikhongchhari upazila.

They have continued to enter Bangladesh over the years due to Bangladesh’s humanitarian approach. Border guards like BGB and other security forces have never pushed back Rohingyas. Had Bangladesh taken such a stance, it could have led to the largest push-back in history. Instead, Bangladesh acted with compassion, remembering how nearly 10 million Bangladeshis took refuge in India during the 1971 Liberation War. However, this compassion has now made Bangladesh an innocent victim of its neighbour’s internal crisis.

The Rohingya crisis is not just a humanitarian issue—it has multifaceted impacts on Bangladesh’s security, economy, and environment. The social structure, law and order, employment, and environment in Cox’s Bazar and nearby areas are under severe strain. As international aid decreases, public resentment grows. Extremist group infiltration, arms and drug smuggling, and the spread of gang culture have become major concerns.

India pushes in registered Rohingyas
Besides genocide by Myanmar and oppression by the Arakan Army, India recently pushed five UNHCR-registered Rohingya citizens into Bangladesh. The BGB detained them and discovered they were members of the same family residing in the Matia refugee camp in Assam. At dawn on May 7, the 22 BGB Battalion arrested them near Newhat Bazar, Bhawal Kuri border area in Char Bhurungamari union of Kurigram.

It’s worth noting that outside the approximately 1.3 million Rohingyas in Bangladesh and 700,000 in Rakhine, many others live around the world—some in camps, others as immigrants. For instance, over 400,000 are in Saudi Arabia, over 200,000 in Pakistan, 150,000+ in Malaysia, around 100,000 in Thailand, about 40,000 in India, and more than 10,000 in the United States. In other words, Bangladesh currently hosts the largest Rohingya population, none of whom are citizens of Bangladesh—or recognised by Myanmar either. So how long will Bangladesh bear this burden alone?

The maze of repatriation
Since 2017, when hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas fled into Bangladesh, there have been repeated claims that Myanmar would take them back in phases. However, the fundamental question remains: why would a government that does not recognize Rohingyas as citizens and has violently displaced them with murder, rape, and arson willingly take them back? It seems unlikely unless forced. But who will compel Myanmar?

Despite efforts by the UN, Myanmar’s junta does not appear to heed any international or regional organization or superpower, possibly due to support from China and Russia. Thus, it’s not so simple for Bangladesh or the UN to enforce repatriation.

Myanmar signed a repatriation agreement with Bangladesh in January 2018, aiming to start the process within two months. Bangladesh provided repatriation lists in six phases between 2018 and 2020. In 2023, a pilot plan was made to return 1,100 Rohingyas. That, too, failed. Despite many high-level meetings, diplomatic efforts, and Chinese and ASEAN mediation, no Rohingyas have returned.

In 2019, two repatriation attempts failed as the refugees cited safety concerns in Rakhine. Since then, the repatriation process has been stalled indefinitely.

During a visit to Cox’s Bazar camps on March 14, UN Secretary-General António Guterres and Chief Adviser Dr Muhammad Yunus said they would work to ensure that Rohingyas could return to celebrate Eid in their own homes in Rakhine next year.

The next day, Guterres told reporters that international and regional pressure must be increased to end conflict in Myanmar and restore democracy. He emphasized the need for joint efforts by the international community and neighboring countries. The first step must be stopping violence and establishing democratic processes, which would enable the return of Rohingyas. He also mentioned the importance of engaging in dialogue with the Arakan Army to facilitate this.

This comment essentially recognised the Arakan Army, and five days later, on March 20, the International Crisis Group advised in a meeting with Dr Yunus that the government should maintain effective contact with the Arakan Army, which controls large parts of Rakhine. A month later, media reported that Arakan Army members held a water festival inside Bangladesh, raising serious national security concerns for Bangladesh.

What is the solution?
1. A key sign that several parties, including the Myanmar government, do not want Rohingya repatriation is the assassination of Rohingya leader Mohib Ullah in the Kutupalong camp. He was organizing repatriation efforts, meeting with world leaders, and even addressed a massive rally in 2019, declaring it “Genocide Day.” Later, he was assassinated, possibly by Myanmar-backed agents inciting conflict among Rohinghas.

2. Escaping the maze of repatriation requires not only diplomacy but national unity and coordinated international pressure. Bangladesh must treat the crisis as a matter of national security and human rights. If Bangladesh's contact with the Arakan Army strains ties with Myanmar, repatriation may stall. However, as the Arakan Army controls much of Rakhine, without their cooperation, repatriation is unlikely. If they succeed in establishing autonomy and rely on Bangladesh for support, repatriation could become feasible—possibly explaining why corridor talks and ties with the Arakan Army are now in the spotlight. But whether this corridor poses a security threat to Bangladesh remains a key question, especially from opposition parties like BNP.

3. Another idea is to establish a UN-supervised safe zone in Rakhine for repatriation. However, this may require a peacekeeping mission. Since China has major investments in Rakhine and seeks to retain maritime influence in the region, they may oppose such a mission.

4. Some propose that powerful countries accept Rohingyas in phases. When the US agreed to take a small number in 2022 (starting with 24), questions arose about its effectiveness given the 1.2 million refugees. Still, this move held symbolic value. If wealthy Western and Muslim nations follow suit, Rohingyas might find sustainable lives.

5. Third-country resettlement may be a partial solution but is not comprehensive. No single country can host 1.2–1.3 million people. Countries also have political and social constraints. Refugees face strict rules. If integrated into host countries’ workforces, it could work—but trust and cultural differences pose challenges.

6. The beliefs, culture, customs, and practices of the Rohingya people are significantly different from those of European and American societies. As a result, a major question arises: should they be kept in camps solely as refugees, or should they be integrated into the mainstream population? Perhaps for this reason, even many large and economically strong countries are not very enthusiastic about resettling large numbers of Rohingyas. That is, before giving refuge to any persecuted population, they take into account their own national security and social cohesion.

7. Among Muslim countries, there are political and regional diversities in interests. Due to this, some countries do not wish to play an active role in refugee resettlement, as it might affect their internal stability and international relations. Although they have not taken any major steps toward direct resettlement, countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and other Gulf nations have provided financial assistance to support the Rohingyas. Malaysia and Indonesia have taken in a small number of Rohingya refugees; however, compared to the number sheltered in Bangladesh, that support is minimal.

8. The most effective solution to the Rohingya crisis is to return them to Rakhine, from where they were expelled—this is their birthplace—and they must be sent back with full citizenship rights. In this regard, international pressure needs to be exerted on the Myanmar government. They must be compelled. Furthermore, if the Arakan Army succeeds in establishing autonomy in Rakhine, pressure must also be applied on them to facilitate the Rohingyas' return to their homeland. Bangladesh certainly cannot, and will not, shelter millions of people from another country indefinitely.

9. Some believe that a separate state or autonomous region for the Rohingyas in Rakhine could be an effective solution; however, that too is quite difficult now. This is because it is not the Rohingyas, but the Arakan Army that now controls Rakhine. And the Arakan Army is also hostile toward the Rohingyas.

10. The idea that Bangladesh will push the Rohingyas back across the Naf River at gunpoint into Myanmar is also inhumane. Rather, if such an act is attempted, Bangladesh will face global criticism, and the humanitarian image it has earned by sheltering the Rohingyas will come under serious question.

11. An international conference on the Rohingya crisis is scheduled to be held this September under the initiative of the United Nations. For now, there is hope that this conference may open new doors for the repatriation of the Rohingyas—we build castles in the air with that hope.

In conclusion, the Rohingya issue is both an ethnic minority and an international problem. Therefore, just as the crisis is not Bangladesh’s fault, solving it is not solely Bangladesh’s responsibility either. Although Bangladesh has provided shelter to the Rohingyas fleeing persecution on humanitarian grounds, this cannot be a permanent solution. The solution lies in the hands of Myanmar. Either the Myanmar government must recognize the Rohingyas as citizens and take them back, or a separate state or autonomous region must be established in Rakhine where the Rohingyas can live peacefully alongside the Arakan Army. No other solution is likely to be sustainable. However, in the future, the Rohingyas may attempt to fight both the Myanmar government and the Arakan Army to build an independent state of their own in Rakhine; but the outcome of that struggle will depend on which side gets support from regional powers such as China, India, and others—and on the role of the United States.

Amin Al Rashid: Journalist and writer