CHIN CHRONICLES, CHT COMPLICATIONS, COLLATERAL CONCERNS, COUNTRY CHALLENGES

COEXISTENCE: The Chin State is mountain terrain on the northwestern Myanmar and named after the Chin people who live there. The impoverished region’s inhabitants – Chin - are closely related to the Kuki and the Mizo communities. The Chin State shares borders India’s Mizoram state, which is inhabited primarily by the Mizos. The Chin State also has a common border with Bangladesh’s Rangamati and Bandarban of the hill tracts. These two districts consist of a noteworthy number of Kuki-Chin community members. So, the Kuki-Chin community is spread over hilly areas in Bangladesh, Mizoram, and Myanmar. While Bangladesh has had its share of insurgency and long internal conflict in the hill tracts, Mizoram and Myanmar continue to have their issues as well.

CALIBRATION: First and foremost, we have the ongoing conflict in Rakhine State, a situation that is practically changing not only the governance and power structure of Rakhine, but also forcing both Bangladesh and India to consider re-strategizing their approach Rakhine and Myanmar as new actors become prominent in Rakhine. Both Bangladesh and India have their issues i.e. Rohingya for Bangladesh to consider the aforementioned re-strategy.

CONDITION: On 27 October 2023, the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) – known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance - launched a multi-front offensive operation against the Myanmar government. Several other ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), including the People’s Defence Force (PDF), the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and the Karenni Army (KA), have joined the offensive. In their efforts against the Tatmadaw, they have captured several towns and military installations from the Myanmar Armed Forces, resulting in a situation where the Tatmadaw is all but surrendered the territory to the Brotherhood. Several other ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), including the People’s Defence Force (PDF), the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and the Karenni Army (KA), have joined the offensive. The Chin State or the Chin community is also a prominent player in this situation.

CHRONICLE: Since 1960, the Chin have engaged in continual insurgency against the Myanmar government. Presently, the Chin National Army (CNA), the Kuki National Army (KNA), the Chin-Kuki Liberation Army, the Chinland Defence Force (CDF), and the Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) are among some of the EAOs active in the state. When the CNA and the Myanmar government in 2012 signed a ceasefire agreement, things had become calm. However, the Chins opposed the 2021 coup d’état in Myanmar. This resulted in situation to deteriorate, again. The CNA is allied with the National Unity Government (NUG), a government-in-exile formed in response to the coup. Meanwhile, several Chin EAOs, including the CDF and the CNDF, became members of the the Brotherhood’s PDF, the armed wing of the NUG. By September 2022, about 70% of the Chin State was under their control. Since the start of the Brotherhood’s campaign in 2023, violence in the Chin State has increased. On one side, the Chin EAOs are engaged in hostilities against the Tatmadaw; on the other side, the AA and the Tatmadaw conflict has reached Chin State complicating situation for the Chin State southern inhabitants.

COMPLEXITY: Mizo nationalists in India have waged an insurgency against the Indian government since the late 1950s. Recent ethnic clashes and tensions in Manipur has been an added factor as Mizoram hosts refugees from there. The events in Myanmar and Manipur, which have people who share kinship ties with Mizos, have had a spillover effect on Bangladesh for the porous borders the Chin State shares with Mizoram and hill areas of Bangladesh. The Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) aka Bawm Party in Chittagong Hill Tracts has been more of a security irritant or concern that had been trying to wage a passive insurgency within Bangladesh territories with a force of estimated 3 to 4 thousand, according to reports. Experts and analysts also inform us that the KNF is politically led by Nathan Bawm and militarily by Vanchun Lian Master. The KNA has killed several personnel of the Bangladesh Army and numerous civilians, and engaged in kidnapping and extortion. Moreover, the KNA has engaged in armed conflicts with other ethnic minority organizations in the CHT, including the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS), the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF), and the Mog Liberation Party (MLP). Reports also inform KNF being extensively engaged in narcotics trade. This threatens the fragile peace in the CHT, hamper its socio-economic development, and incite inter-ethnic conflict.

CLAIM: The KNF began with the reported ideology of opposition of Chakma domination in the CHT, with the ultimate goal of establishing an autonomous Kuki-Chin state that would carve out the territory of nine sub-districts of Rangamati and Bandarban making them part of the larger Kuki-Chin sovereignn state. To quote Brigadier retd. Sakhawat Hossain, an expert on the issue, the context for KNF’s claim was created basically after the signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts peace accord in 1998. The facilities and opportunities that emerged from the accord primarily were Rangamati and Khagrachhari-centric and most of the beneficiaries were the Chakma and then the Marma. The Kuki-Chin claimed that they have taken up arms because of the deprivation and disparity that has been created. However, analysis of KNF’s activities over the years clearly demonstrates its claims to be hyperbole veiling vested interests for something petty but sinister.

CONVERSION: KNF has over the years converted its nature, and become a complex conduit of narcotics trade, and earnings for jobless, disenfranchised, persecuted, impoverished youth. It’s changing nature had become evident when the group began training religious militant groups in recent past. As Brig. Sakhawat writes, they began providing training to so-called Islamic militants in exchange of money. They probably used these earnings to procure more arms. The militant groups were duly suppressed by Bangladesh security forces, causing KNF to stand down at the time. Given recent events, it was a mere strategic withdrawal as it seems.

COLLATERAL: The recent KNF attacks in Thanchi, Ruma and Alikadam of Bandarban in a short span of time have raised concerns among Bangladesh policy makers for the safety and security of CHT and its people. Three bank robberies within 16 hours in Bandarban, coupled with the kidnapping of Sonali Bank's Ruma branch manager, have raised alarms in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and for the policymakers recently with the authorities believing that KNF is responsible.

COUNTERMEASURES: A coordinated operation has been launched under the leadership of the army to arrest the armed members of Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) in Bandarban, recover weapons and restore peace in the area. The army chief General SM Shafiuddin Ahmed informed that some people have already been arrested and two weapons have been recovered. The army chief further said that the operation will continue until the terrorists are eliminated.

CHALLENGE: Chin State is an active conflict zone. It has grievances of its own that are further complicated with add-ons of national, regional, and social issues. The situation is too complex for strategizing a cohesive approach. The presence of armed actors in the region in addition to those closely linked with the Kuki-Chin community, i.e. the Tatmadaw, the PDF, and the AA, and most likely other armed groups of various backgrounds and with vested interests has created a open market for illegal weapons in the region. The porous borders of Bangladesh in that region make it challenging to provide effective vigilance. Moreover, it is unclear whether the conflict ongoing in Chin and Rakhine will further deteriorate, and if it does, how it would impact the borders, bordering regions, and security within Bangladesh. The situation is likely to only intensify logistics support for the KNF. The situation will also likely increase population displacement putting further pressure on Bangladesh who is already hosting a large community of refugees. Further influx will begin to tear the region at the seams as the area is one of the most impoverished, and has had and continues to have its share of internal security concerns.

CULPRIT: KNF is the key culprit in trying to abuse the situation for a vested interest of minting profits from a conflict torn porous region. The key focus for the group is create and continue a fragile security situation in the region, causing fear and trepidation among the locals. This would assist the KNF in continuing their narcotics trade, a business that has thrived through the porous routes of the three conjoined borders of Mizoram, Chin, and CHT. Their claims of fighting for their ethnic or social rights, and vision of building a state for their community are flimsy at best. The socioeconomic condition, infrastructure situation, inaccessibility of the area, and internal rifts within the inhabitants make it clear that the region, nor its flawed dream merchants are in any way ready to build a state of their own. It just does not resonate any realism.

CONCERNS: To quote Vanda Felbab-Brown is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution from the study A State-building Approach to the Drug Trade Problem, the drug trade can threaten the state politically by providing an avenue for criminal organizations to enter the political space. This undermines the existing political arrangements and stability. Impunity for criminal activity also increases, undermining the credibility and deterrence of the justice system. Moreover, powerful traffickers frequently turn to violent means to deter and avoid prosecution. Illicit economies also have huge economic effects. A burgeoning drug economy contributes to inflation, potentially harming legitimate, export-oriented, import-substituting industries. It also displaces legal production. The drug trade, particularly illicit crop cultivation, generates jobs sometimes for hundreds of thousands, if not millions of people in a particular locale. Given the socioeconomic situation in the region, all these are real concerns for authorities, while undermine any claims of KNF’s grandeur of high moral cause.

CONCLUSION: As Brigadier Sakhawat has underscored recently that this group should not be allowed any recognition implicit nor explicit through trying to sit for dialogue with them. The KNF is at best a non-reliable actor for any dialogue, and too niche an actor for any meaning and sustainable outcome of any such dialogue. Thus, the approach that Bangladesh has taken to counter the KNF at the moment is sound and should continue until the goals of this approach are not achieved. Given the conflicts ongoing across the borders, Bangladesh should consider taking a more vigilant and active posture along those borders ensuring better security. Moreover, if any dialogue is warranted, it should be with those are becoming the dominant, authoritative, and controlling actors of Chin and Rakhine State, and not the underlings of such actors like KNF, who are mostly vested with petty financial interests abusing the situation.

Author: Political and International Affairs Analyst.