Doubtful whether Rohingya repatriation will happen at all

In the international arena, Dr Yunus's reputation is sky-high. At his call, UN Secretary-General António Guterres rushed to Bangladesh, wore traditional pajama-panjabi during Ramadan, and even had iftar with the Rohingyas. Dr Yunus announced that they would work jointly with the UN so that the Rohingyas can celebrate Eid next year in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. On the other hand, Dr Khalilur Rahman, the high representative of the chief adviser, said that arrangements could be made to repatriate 180,000 Rohingyas selected by the Myanmar government during the Awami League government. But after this announcement, it was heard that in the last year alone, another 118,000 Rohingyas have newly entered Bangladesh. Yet, seeing the efforts of the UN Secretary-General and the interim government, we hoped that something would finally happen. Something did happen—Chief Advisor Dr Muhammad Yunus, delivering a speech in the Chattogram regional dialect at a Rohingya gathering, reminded the world of the emotional bond between the people of Chattogram and the Rohingya.

Our compassion for the Rohingya stems from the fact that they are Muslims; however, there is no scope to label the long-standing persecution of the Rohingya community as purely religion-based. It is also not accurate to conclude that the Rohingyas are being persecuted solely because they are Muslims—because in Myanmar’s 2014 government census, four other Muslim communities were officially recognised, and they possess citizenship and voting rights. Yet, the Myanmar government has never recognised the Rohingyas as its citizens, considering them instead to be immigrants.

On the other hand, the Rohingyas themselves have never truly regarded Myanmar as their homeland; they have always agitated for an independent “Rohingyaland”. Members of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army are labeled by the Myanmar government as "Bengali terrorists”. It is astonishing when the United Nations describes Bangladesh’s efforts to repatriate Rohingya refugees as deceitful and coercive, or when the UN urges the Bangladeshi government to grant them citizenship. The UN’s clear stance is that Rohingya repatriation will not be possible until the situation in Myanmar becomes safe, dignified, sustainable, and suitable for their voluntary return. This clearly indicates that the UN is not genuinely committed to sending the Rohingyas back to Myanmar; rather, it wants to resolve the crisis by arranging for their permanent settlement in Bangladesh, or it seeks to use the Rohingya refugees as political tools to play a game in Arakan.

Despite all-out efforts, the Bangladesh government has not been able to repatriate a single refugee to Myanmar—because Myanmar does not recognise the Rohingyas as its citizens. On the other hand, the Rohingyas themselves do not want to return to Myanmar. Some among them even believe that the Cox’s Bazar area is their ancestral homeland. The armed group of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army also supports keeping the refugees in Bangladesh, as they believe they will never have a place in Myanmar—where the government has already identified and marked them. As a result, anyone expressing interest in returning to Myanmar is being threatened with death. One of the popular leaders in favour of repatriation, Mohib Ullah, has already been assassinated.

On the other hand, according to the United Nations' refugee policy, once someone has been granted asylum as a refugee, they cannot be forcibly repatriated against their will. Since the imposition of military rule, Myanmar has been overwhelmed with movements, resistance, and guerrilla attacks across its territory. In the Rakhine State, the indigenous Buddhist armed group “Arakan Army” has engaged in armed conflict against the military government and has taken control of almost the entire region. Over 270 kilometres of Myanmar's border with Bangladesh is now under their control. In such a volatile environment, it is difficult to say with certainty whether a favourable and acceptable condition for the Rohingyas to return to Rakhine can ever be restored.

During the diplomatic campaign led by India’s late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1971, the refugee crisis stirred global emotion and action. In contrast, no such global outcry has been created around the issue of Rohingya repatriation. Moreover, the Rohingyas have largely failed to mobilise the world in support of their rights. No country has taken a strong stance in favour of the Rohingyas. While a few Muslim-majority countries, including Turkey, initially showed concern, they are now silent on the issue of Rohingya repatriation. Meanwhile, China remains staunchly supportive of the Myanmar government. In the UN Security Council, China stands firmly ready to use its veto power against any decision favouring the Rohingya Muslims of Rakhine.

While Bangladesh voluntarily repatriated its refugees who had taken shelter in India in the past, the Myanmar government has shown not even the slightest interest in taking back the Rohingya refugees. Even there is no visible effort from any country or international organisation to compel Myanmar to do so.

Who the original inhabitants of the Rakhine State are, and why the Myanmar government does not recognise the Rohingyas as citizens—these issues have been the subject of much discussion and analysis, but no universally accepted opinion or clear understanding has emerged. During the British colonial rule, the British brought in Bengali labourers from nearby regions to work in the fertile valleys of Rakhine for agricultural purposes. By treating Muslims in Rakhine as refugees, the British themselves sowed the seeds of unrest.

Although the British prepared a list of 139 ethnic groups in Myanmar during their rule, they did not include the Rohingyas in that list. Citing this exclusion, the Myanmar government has long regarded the Muslims of Rakhine as "Bengalis" and denied them citizenship. Because the Rohingyas are not recognised as citizens of Myanmar, they have no passports. Many Rohingyas have traveled abroad using Bangladeshi passports—leading to the blame falling on Bengalis if any of them commit crimes overseas.

During World War II, the Buddhist Rakhines of Arakan supported Japan, while the Muslims of Arakan sided with the British. Just as the collaborators and Biharis gained privileges during Bangladesh’s Liberation War through their alliance with the Pakistani army, the Rohingya Muslims of Arakan received similar benefits from the British during the Second World War. In exchange for their support, the British had promised to create a separate Muslim state in northern Rakhine, but they did not fulfill that promise. As a result, just as the collaborators and Biharis faced repercussions after Pakistan's defeat in the Liberation War, the Rohingyas faced similar consequences from the Rakhines following the British defeat by the Japanese in Burma. Thousands of Rohingya Muslims were subjected to torture, rape, and killings at the hands of the Japanese and the Rakhines. Due to such atrocities, many Rohingyas fled to Chattogram and settled there permanently. In 1962, after General Ne Win seized power, Myanmar’s military junta capitalised on this lingering hostility to further divide the Muslim and Buddhist Rakhine communities, turning them into enemies of each other.

During the partition of India in 1947, the Rohingya Muslims attempted to merge with Pakistan, and for this purpose, Burmese Muslim leaders even met with Jinnah. This marked the beginning of the distrustful relationship between the Rohingyas and the Burmese government. Since then, the Rohingyas have been waging a war to establish an independent Arakan and received support from the then Pakistani government. However, after the establishment of Bangladesh as an independent state in 1971, this support to the Rohingya armed groups ceased.

The Rohingyas have always aspired to establish settlements in Bangladesh. Many hills in Banshkhali in Chattogram are now under the control of the Rohingyas, and in some areas of Cox's Bazar, their influence is so strong that local Bangladeshis feel like foreigners in their own country. Arms, yaba, human trafficking, robbery, and the modern-day slave trade via boats to the jungles of Malaysia are their main sources of income. Some locals of Cox's Bazar are also involved in these illegal businesses and do not want the Rohingyas to return to Myanmar.

It is not just the Myanmar government — the relationship between the Rohingya Muslims and the Buddhist population of Arakan has always been fraught. Even if Arakan separates from Myanmar or a favourable living environment is created through some form of autonomy, many Rohingyas may no longer wish to return. For those like Mohibullah who want to go back to Myanmar, the primary condition for repatriation is that all Rohingyas must be granted Myanmar citizenship. However, neither the Myanmar government nor the Arakanese Buddhists recognise them as citizens.

There is no significant international pressure on this issue, and even if there were, Myanmar is unlikely to yield. Over time, Myanmar has become accustomed to Western sanctions and, thanks to its close ties with China, has largely ignored such restrictions. The country is expected to continue doing so. Therefore, resolving the refugee crisis is extremely difficult, and there is doubt as to whether Rohingya repatriation will happen at all. Moreover, those who benefit from the criminal sanctuary that has developed are actively preventing the Rohingyas from leaving Bangladesh.

Ziauddin Ahmed: Former Executive Director, Bangladesh Bank.