The old trick of holding onto power

“When people on the street say you should stay for another five years”—this remark by Home Affairs Advisor Lieutenant General (Retd.) Md. Jahangir Alam Chowdhury closely resembles a Facebook status posted by Sarjis Alam, the Northern Regional Chief Coordinator of the National Citizen Party (NCP).

On March 29, Sarjis Alam wrote on his Facebook wall:
“I will always long to see someone like Professor Dr. Muhammad Yunus—a true statesman—serve as the Prime Minister of an elected government in Bangladesh for five years.”

Twelve days later, on April 10, after visiting Shantiganj Police Station in Sunamganj, the Home Affairs Advisor told reporters,
"The country’s law and order situation has improved. Efforts have been intensified and will continue to maintain it. People on the streets say we should stay for another five years.”
(The Daily Star Online, April 10, 2025)

Interestingly, both the Home Advisor and Sarjis Alam invoke the idea of “five years.” Why are they specifically saying five years? Is it because a government term in Bangladesh is typically five years? The current interim government has already spent eight months in power. When they say “five years,” do they mean an additional four years and four months? Or do they mean a fresh five-year term altogether? That remains unclear.

This raises a few important questions:

1. By what mechanism would the interim government or a hypothetical government led by Dr. Yunus remain in power for five years?
This is not just a constitutional issue but a moral one. In the past, even rulers who seized power at gunpoint sought electoral validation. Between 1991 and 2007, four unelected caretaker governments governed Bangladesh, each with constitutional legitimacy. However, the 15th Amendment in 2011 abolished the caretaker system, creating constitutional ambiguity when the Awami League government fell on August 5 last year. Eventually, under Article 106 of the Constitution, a special government led by Dr. Yunus was formed. While this government wasn’t elected by popular vote, it was granted a kind of constitutional legitimacy. But if it now seeks to extend its rule or serve a full term like an elected government, what legal or political process would grant such legitimacy?

2. Sarjis Alam’s aspiration—shared perhaps by others—suggests that many believe a globally respected figure like Dr. Yunus could bring transformative change. Wishing for him to stay in power isn’t inherently wrong or illogical. But how did the Home Affairs Advisor determine that the public actually wants this government to stay for five years?
He claims, “People on the street say so.” But who are these people? In a nation of nearly 200 million, what percentage do they represent?

Even if Sarjis Alam’s personal wish reflects his party’s stance, the National Citizen Party’s electoral support is untested. Without a free, fair, neutral, and credible election, it’s impossible to know their actual share of public support.

Among the twelve national elections held so far, excluding the last three, we still have data on voter shares from 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2008. But the NCP is a new party and has not yet contested any election. Hence, we have no way of knowing how many people share Sarjis Alam’s hopes. So, basing a sweeping claim on vague statements from “people on the street” is not just misleading—it’s meaningless.

Whenever the Home Affairs Advisor has traveled for official purposes, some people may have voiced support, chanted slogans, or privately urged him to stay. But that does not reveal how many people across the country feel the same. Who are these people? Why are they saying this? These questions deserve scrutiny.

More importantly, public perception of the interim government’s performance over the past eight months can be inferred to some extent from media reports and discussions circulating on social media.

Over the past eight months, certain words have dominated the interim government’s discourse: reform, dialogue, unity, justice. Statements from top officials suggest that holding a national election and transferring power to an elected government isn’t their immediate priority. Their to-do list appears to be:
1. Justice
2. Reform
3. Election
Their top agenda seems to be prosecuting crimes committed during the July coup and under the previous regime, especially through the International Crimes Tribunal. Reform is their second priority. So far, eleven reform commissions have been formed, six of which have publicly released their full reports. The National Unity Commission is also engaging in dialogue with political parties. The plan is to conclude these processes with a “July Accord.”

However, it’s unclear how many of these recommendations will gain political consensus. Each report contains numerous proposals that could take years to implement. So, if justice and reforms can't be completed within a few months, is that why the Home Advisor and the NCP believe this government should remain in power for five years?

While there is limited opposition to justice and reform in principle, what exactly constitutes “reform” varies widely between the government, political parties, and the general public.

For ordinary people, reform means improvement in daily struggles—accessing services, living safely and comfortably, earning a livelihood. If the answers to the following are “no,” then the reforms are irrelevant to them:

Is life safer and easier than before?
Has it become less of a hassle to access public services?
Are people spending less to survive?
Do they still face the same corruption and extortion in offices?
Do they still fear mob violence or political targeting?

If their answers are negative, then constitutional debates about a bicameral parliament, proportional representation, or even the country’s official name will fail to resonate.

In the last eight months:
The government has failed to control mob violence.
In several cases, it even appeared to incite or tolerate such behavior.
Law enforcement’s inaction raised questions.
Business leaders have expressed dissatisfaction with the economic climate.
Outside of improvements in foreign reserves and staple goods markets, few signs of public contentment are visible.
Given this backdrop, how many people truly want this government to stay longer remains an open question.

Let’s assume that a majority of the country does want this government to remain in power for five years. That they believe it will bring institutional reforms, boost investment, increase employment, raise incomes, reduce costs, and restore peace. If that trust exists, then yes, the government should stay—but only through constitutional means.

The only way to test public confidence is through elections. However, current members of the interim government cannot contest elections while still in power—that would be unconstitutional. So, if they believe they enjoy majority support, they must step down, join a political party, and participate in elections under a neutral government. If they win, they can legitimately serve a five-year term.

Without elections, there’s no way to verify if people genuinely want them in power. Remaining in office long-term without a mandate is neither legal nor moral. Political parties won’t accept it. If they are forced to mobilize against the government, it will lead to unnecessary conflict.

Aside from national elections, referendums were once a way to assess public support. Bangladesh has held three referendums:
May 30, 1977: To gauge public support for President Ziaur Rahman’s policies.
March 21, 1985: To approve President Ershad’s continued leadership until elections.
September 15, 1991: On whether to approve the 12th Amendment to the Constitution.

In each case, voter turnout was low, and the government allegedly fabricated results to show overwhelming support. Researchers and witnesses confirm that these referendums lacked genuine public participation.

So, if the current interim government holds a referendum to test its support, it’s unclear how many people would vote—or what the results would look like. More importantly, the current Constitution no longer allows referendums. That provision has been abolished. Therefore, there’s no easy or legitimate way to assess public confidence in this government.

Governments, political parties, and even state agencies conduct opinion polls before elections. But these surveys often lack credibility, suffer from bias, and reflect pre-determined outcomes rather than genuine sentiment.

So, if members of the interim government believe their agenda of justice and reform justifies long-term rule, they must seek a public mandate. There is no alternative to a free, fair, impartial, and credible election—especially since the destruction of the electoral system was one of the key reasons behind the previous government's downfall.

If this government tries to replace elections with “justice and reform” the way the last one replaced democracy with “development,” they will only further alienate political parties and deepen the existing divide.

Amin Al Rashid: Journalist and writer