Outcome of mass uprisings disappointing

I have found no difference in the outcome of the three popular uprisings I have witnessed. The outcome of each has been identical. Merely a transfer of power was the ultimate outcome of these uprisings, born of much sacrifice and self-sacrifice. The people who had contributed the most to the movement did not gain power. As a result, popular uprisings have only changed the rulers; collective success has not been achieved.

Agartala Conspiracy Case triggered the 1969 mass uprising. The case was not false. The late Colonel Shawkat Ali, one of the accused in the case, candidly admitted in his book that “the Agartala Case was not false.” The extreme discriminatory treatment of Bengali soldiers and officers in the Pakistan military by non-Bengali Pakistanis had angered the Bengali members of the armed forces. Under the leadership of Lt Commander Moazzem Hossain, they secretly undertook preparations for an uprising. They even informed Sheikh Mujib of the matter. He advised them to proceed. For this reason, a few Bengali military officers, including steward Mujib, went to Agartala and held discussions.

The plan was leaked when they were in the process of meeting the Bengali soldiers and officers in all the cantonments of the country to unite them. Consequently, the individuals involved were arrested one after another and charged with treason. To serve political interest, Sheikh Mujib was made the principal accused in the case, and Lt Commander Moazzem Hossain the second accused. In addition, both military and civilian officials were charged, and the Agartala Conspiracy Case was tried in a special tribunal inside the cantonment.

During the treason trial, Sheikh Mujib sent a letter through journalist Ataus Samad to Maulana Bhashani, urging him to organise a movement for their release. Upon receiving the letter, Maulana Bhashani immediately launched a movement. The turning point came on January 20, 1969, when Asad, a Chhatra Union (Menon faction) activist and a peasant organiser, was killed. The movement quickly spread nationwide, becoming a mass movement. On January 24, the killing of young Matiur transformed it into a full-fledged mass uprising.

Sensing the worsening situation, Ayub Khan withdrew the case and called a round-table conference. Disregarding Maulana Bhashani’s instructions, Sheikh Mujib attended the conference, but it produced no results. Despite every effort to reach a compromise, Ayub Khan was forced to step down when the military withdrew its support for him. In his place came another military ruler, General Yahya Khan. In other words, the outcome of the 1969 autonomy movement and mass uprising was merely a change of military ruler. The new ruler, Yahya Khan, dangled the bait of elections, prompting nationalist politicians to abandon the movement in pursuit of elections and power. Although the Awami League won an absolute majority in the election, instead of transferring power, delaying tactics were used to advance the planned Operation Searchlight. Then came the genocide of March 25 — an operation to annihilate an unprepared and defenceless nation. But the Bengali nation could not be suppressed or exterminated. The resistance war began, and after the formation of the Mujibnagar Government, with India’s assistance, the Liberation War was fought, achieving independence at the cost of three million lives and the honour of two lakh women. After the 1969 uprising, our politicians, having been ensnared by the lure of elections, allowed the Pakistani military to attempt to wipe out the Bengali nation through brutal genocide. Yet the 1969 uprising had been the culmination of a long struggle against Ayub Khan, not an immediate or sudden occurrence.

We have seen the sequence of events following the 1990 uprising against the autocrat HM Ershad. The potential created by the anti-Ershad uprising, achieved through unanimous support across all parties, was pushed towards political division through post-uprising elections. Although the BNP formed the government after winning the election, it broke its pledge to implement the three-alliances’ framework for the uprising and instead adopted the culture of military rule. The Awami League also became ensnared in that same culture. In truth, Ershad could not have been overthrown by the uprising if the military had not withdrawn its support. In the success of the 1990 uprising, too, our two main political parties did not hesitate to stab the collective aspirations of the people in the back.

In the case of the mass uprising known as the July Movement, it was the silent role of the military that enabled the uprising to succeed. The result of the uprising was merely a change of ruler; the system itself did not change. Although people from all walks of life participated in this uprising, the central leadership did not allow any political party or social or cultural institution near the leadership. Their goals and objectives were steeped in conspiracy, while the views and paths of the ordinary protesters, who made the greatest sacrifices, were poles apart.

Naming the movement as one against discrimination did energise the nation, but it was only against quota discrimination, not social discrimination. They did not even mention social discrimination. In fact, their position was directly opposed to public aspirations. The government that is now in power, having come to office through a change in rulers, has no legitimacy under our Constitution. It assumed office under the direction of the High Court. The primary task of this interim government is to hand over power to an elected government through an election. Yet in the past 10 months there has been no sign of this. Beyond executive or routine work, we have been shocked to see the indirect support of this government for the formation of political parties. We have also been shocked by its suicidal decision to hand over the country’s land and ports to foreigners.

By now, almost all political parties and citizens have taken a stand against these decisions, which are beyond the interim government’s jurisdiction. On what authority are they making one unauthorised decision after another, becoming increasingly unpopular? The mask of a non-partisan, neutral government has already fallen away.

It must be acknowledged that if the military had carried out the instructions of the previous head of government, there is doubt as to whether the July uprising would have succeeded. The July mass uprising succeeded only because the military disobeyed the government’s orders, in the same sequence as in 1969 and 1990. The three uprisings succeeded not only because of the people’s movement, but because of the role of the military. They acted with the intention of preserving the existing system, playing a direct role in converting the people’s uprising into a transfer of power. Just as bourgeois political parties, civil society, NGOs, and bureaucracies of the state are all opposed to social revolution, so too they are united in keeping the existing system intact through reforms. That is why three popular uprisings could not achieve real success. This is as sad as it is disappointing.

The fundamental differences between the 1969 and 1990 uprisings and the 2024 uprising are broadly clear. Since August 5, a grand festival of mob violence has been taking place across the country. Citing the involvement of the previous government, factories and industries have been set on fire, vandalised, and shut down, rendering countless workers unemployed. Numerous incidents have occurred in which teachers have been insulted by their own students and forcibly removed from institutions. Law and order in the country has collapsed completely, and no member of the state’s forces responsible for ensuring the safety of people and property has been seen to step forward. The country has turned into a land of terror. Such ferocity of political vengeance has never been seen before. Therefore, the fundamental differences between the 1969 and 1990 uprisings and the 2024 popular uprising are clearly visible.

Mozharul Islam Babla: Executive Editor, Notun Diganta