Bhutto’s attempt to reunite broken Pakistan

In the last week of June 1974, Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Dhaka. Although visiting the Savar National Memorial was part of the official protocol, Bhutto initially expressed his unwillingness to go there. However, under the firm insistence of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bhutto was compelled to visit the memorial to pay tribute to those who had been martyred in 1971. Yet the shrewd Bhutto did not go to the memorial in formal attire; he went wearing a T-shirt and a golf cap. He objected to the playing of a bugle, the laying of wreaths and a gun salute.

This was Bhutto. This was his attitude towards the Bengali nation and its heroic martyrs. And towards Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, he harboured boundless resentment, hatred and political jealousy.

An account of Bhutto’s attitude and initial reaction following the brutal assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and most of his family on 15 August 1975 can be found in the recollections of Benazir Bhutto.

In an interview published in Ekattor in the Eyes of Pakistanis, edited by researchers Muntasir Mamun and Mohiuddin Ahmed, Benazir Bhutto said that on the night of 15 August 1975, they were at the Prime Minister’s residence in Rawalpindi. Her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, knocked on her door and asked her to come to his room.

He told her that the President of Bangladesh had been killed by his own people. The incident, she said, seemed deeply tragic and horrifying to them. They learned that his wife had also been killed.

Gradually, they came to know that his young son had also been dragged out from under a bed and shot dead. They remembered Sheikh Mujib with great respect as a fiercely confident politician.

There is no way of independently verifying the truth of Benazir’s account regarding the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Even if we accept this account at face value, the measures Zulfikar Ali Bhutto began taking as soon as dawn broke were the exact opposite of those of a grieving man.

Rather, they threatened the very existence of an independent and sovereign Bangladesh. They represented a renewed, albeit ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to reunite a broken Pakistan.

Bhutto never accepted the existence of an independent Bangladesh from the heart. Even after Bangladesh became independent, on his way back from New York, he told journalists in London that Bangladesh was still a part of his country. Perhaps that was why, following Sheikh Mujib’s assassination on 15 August 1975, Bhutto, apparently elated by the development, lost no time in taking steps to cooperate with Khondaker Mostaq and his associates. He saw it as a golden opportunity.

On 16 August, the Pakistani government issued a statement supporting the new government, describing the change as historic.

The statement said, “As an expression of our first and spontaneous goodwill towards the fraternal people of Bangladesh, I (Bhutto), on behalf of the people of Pakistan, have decided to send 50,000 tonnes of rice, 10 million yards of cloth and 5 million yards of cotton fabric. ... Let the world know that we are united in happiness and sorrow. We appeal to all members of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and members of the Third World to recognise the new government.”

It is worth mentioning here that Pakistan had extremely close relations with Saudi Arabia in 1975. Following the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Saudi Arabia recognised Bangladesh as an independent and sovereign state. At the same time, Saudi Arabia also declared its support for the Mostaq government.

On 17 August, Bangladeshi media widely reported the recognition of Bangladesh by Saudi Arabia and another Muslim country, Sudan.

That was the Bhutto government’s immediate response. But the shrewd Bhutto did not simply issue a statement and sit back. His plans were far more ambitious. Perhaps he dreamed of reuniting Pakistan.

Khondaker Mostaq had given that dream fresh momentum. Even before Sheikh Mujib was laid to rest, Mostaq had begun the Pakistanisation of Bangladesh.

During the 1971 war, Shafiul Azam had served as the Chief Secretary of Bangladesh. Mostaq brought the bureaucrat back from Pakistan and appointed him Cabinet Secretary.

Similarly, Salahuddin, who had served the Pakistanis during the Liberation War, was brought back to Bangladesh and given responsibility for the Home Ministry. Safdar, a former senior official of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, was brought back from Pakistan and appointed chief of the NSI. Tabarak Hossain, an official of Pakistan’s Foreign Office, was appointed Foreign Secretary.

Taken together, the process amounted to an all-out Pakistanisation.

After taking power from Yahya Khan towards the end of 1971, Bhutto had made only one appeal to the imprisoned Mujib: Pakistan should somehow survive, in some form or another. Dr Kamal Ahmed, who was imprisoned alongside Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the time, said that Bhutto had virtually exhausted every possible means of keeping Pakistan intact—he had almost gone as far as begging Sheikh Mujib to preserve Pakistan in some form. Bhutto even requested that Sheikh Mujib, at least nominally, agree to remain connected to Pakistan through a confederation.

But Bangabandhu gave him no assurance. Instead, upon returning home on 10 January, he made it unequivocally clear that Bangladesh was a blood-soaked independent country. There could be no question of maintaining any relationship with the perpetrators of genocide and murder.

Following Mujib’s assassination, however, Bhutto once again moved forward with his old blueprint. He established a headquarters in London and placed veteran politician Mahmud Ali, who had been born in Bangladesh, in charge of the operation. Mahmud Ali had attracted attention in the 1950s by forming a new secular political party.

Whatever the case, the role of Mostaq and his associates in this process was also significant. This was reflected in the dispatch of Pir Mohsin Ali Dudu Mia to Pakistan as a special envoy. Pir Mohsin Ali Dudu Mia was a right-wing politician and a close friend of Pakistan. Mostaq sent him to Pakistan to strengthen relations further. Bhutto, meanwhile, made every effort through Mahmud Ali in London to make the plan succeed.

There are various views as to why Bhutto and Mostaq’s efforts ultimately failed. Many believe that the rebel officers warned Mostaq against taking any such steps.

Journalist Anthony Mascarenhas wrote in Legacy of Blood that Farooq Rahman had told him, “If Mostaq tried anything like that [reunification], I would blow his head off.”

Apart from this account, there is not much compelling evidence on the matter. However, several other sources point to an Indian role.

On 15 August, Indian High Commissioner Samar Sen was in Delhi. Following Sheikh Mujib’s assassination, air communications between Dhaka and the outside world were suspended, so he travelled from Delhi via Kolkata and reached Dhaka by road on 18 August. After holding some urgent meetings, he met Khondaker Mostaq at Bangabhaban.

Many have suggested that certain remarks—or an implicit warning—during that meeting prevented Mostaq from declaring Bangladesh an Islamic republic. He was also unable to proceed with any plan to bring Bangladesh under the Pakistani flag.

On 15 October 2011, Manas Ghosh, editor of Kolkata’s The Statesman, wrote an article about these developments. He stated that, during his visit to Bangabhaban, Samar Sen read out a diplomatic note to Mostaq. It reportedly said that if the name of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh were changed or an attempt were made to form a confederation with any country, the Indian Army would take appropriate action under the valid treaty between India and Bangladesh—the Bangladesh-India Friendship Treaty.

However, if Mostaq refrained from changing the country’s name or pursuing the idea of a so-called confederation, India would regard whatever had happened on 15 August as an internal matter of Bangladesh.

After hearing Samar Sen’s statement, Mostaq, who had been standing, reportedly collapsed into his seat. Very likely, it was at that moment that Bhutto’s dream of a confederation—or the reunification of Pakistan—finally went out like a dying flame.

Rahat Minhaz
Assistant Professor, Department of Mass Communication and Journalism

Jagannath University