How easy will it be for deposed AL to make a comeback after uprising?

The Awami League, the party that led Bangladesh’s Liberation War, has been ousted from power 53 years after independence through a mass uprising—an event with at least twenty contributing factors. While conspiracy theories and accusations of foreign interference continue to circulate, there is no denying that in recent years the Awami League became increasingly disconnected from the people due to rampant corruption, partisan favoritism, and nepotism.

Since the interim government, led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus, assumed office on August 8 last year, a sweeping crackdown has resulted in the imprisonment of nearly 40 ministers, state ministers, and advisers; around 50 MPs; two former police chiefs; a major general from the army; and 32 high-ranking officials. Two former ministers—Saber Hossain Chowdhury and M A Mannan—have been released on bail. In addition, scores of leaders and activists of the Awami League and its affiliated and fraternal organizations remain in prison across the country.

Party chief Sheikh Hasina and several other senior leaders have taken refuge abroad, particularly in India and the UK. While she remains in Delhi, Hasina occasionally addresses party members online. Some leaders are still active on social media, and occasionally appear on online talk shows. In sporadic instances, Awami League activists have attempted flash processions, often resulting in arrest and imprisonment. Taken together, it’s safe to say that the Awami League is going through the worst phase in its political history.

The date of the next national election remains uncertain. Although the chief adviser has announced that elections will take place sometime between December this year and June 2026, most political parties—and much of the general public—remain skeptical. The National Citizen Party (NCP), which led the July uprising, has clearly stated that no election will be held until the trial and reform of the Awami League is complete. Though not yet a registered political party, the NCP holds significant sway within the government, and its positions often reflect the government's stance. Given that trials and reforms are complex and time-consuming processes, it seems unlikely that elections will take place within the stated timeframe.

Against this backdrop, the question arises: just how feasible is a political comeback for the Awami League? Besides the possibility of banning the party or canceling its registration, it's worth examining its future strategies, organizational strength, and public support base.

1. Organizational Structure and Leadership
The Awami League is a party with a long and storied legacy. Its uninterrupted hold on power from 2009 to July 2024 allowed it to build a robust organizational structure. However, prolonged rule led to grassroots divisions, the rise of a privileged class, and a growing centralization of power in Sheikh Hasina’s hands—all of which ultimately weakened the party. As individual leaders gained prominence, institutional strength eroded. Rebuilding the organization from the grassroots will be both time-consuming and labor-intensive.

2. Public Support and Negative Image
Years of repression, corruption, and lack of accountability have generated deep public resentment against the party—culminating in the July movement. Particularly among young voters, there was a strong yearning for change, which transformed a modest protest for civil service quota reform into a full-blown call for regime change. As people across the political spectrum joined the uprising, it became clear that relying solely on a large vote bank, liberation war credentials, or past achievements will not be enough for the Awami League to bounce back.

3. International Dynamics
The Awami League historically enjoyed close ties with major powers like India, China, and Russia. But their stance following the uprising remains unclear. While India has offered asylum to Sheikh Hasina, its long-term position in Bangladesh's political future is uncertain. Despite regional influence, India cannot act unilaterally in Bangladesh, as it must abide by diplomatic norms and international protocols. Moreover, the Indian central government faces its own internal challenges.

4. Capacity for Movement Politics
In the past, the Awami League demonstrated considerable skill in mobilizing mass movements while in opposition. However, that capacity has significantly eroded due to aging leadership, a dearth of emerging leaders, and disinterest among the youth. These factors call into question the party’s ability to sustain street-level activism in the future.

5. Influence over State Institutions
The Awami League maintained power largely through its control over state institutions—including the administration, law enforcement, and even parts of the judiciary. With that apparatus now dismantled post-uprising, the party must confront a new political reality fraught with uncertainties.

6. Role of the Military
During the July uprising, the military—unlike other security forces—did not obey government orders to suppress the protests. Their refusal to use force played a decisive role in the movement’s success. The Awami League’s comeback prospects now hinge heavily on the military’s position. Historical precedents from 1975 and 2007 show that the military often emerges as a “savior” during national crises—but sometimes pursues its own political ambitions. The party’s future thus depends in part on whether the military seeks to prolong the interim regime and how it views other political actors.

7. Rise of Islamist Forces
Islamist parties and groups, including Jamaat-e-Islami, Hefazat-e-Islam, and Islami Andolon Bangladesh, have become more active since the uprising. Even the banned Hizb-ut-Tahrir tried to reassert its presence after August 5. Although the government prevented them from gaining ground, the involvement of religious groups in the uprising has made the interim regime somewhat sympathetic toward them. Since the Awami League has a long-standing reputation for cracking down on Islamist forces, it will face a major challenge from these actors as it attempts a comeback.

8. Dual Pressure
The rise of Islamist forces creates a dual challenge for the Awami League: domestically, it must counter a well-organized religious opposition; internationally, it must explain its political stance. If the party chooses not to compromise with religious groups, it will struggle to reclaim political space from them.

9. Diaspora Politics and Lobbying
The Awami League still maintains a strong presence among the Bangladeshi diaspora, particularly in the US, UK, Canada, and across Europe. These foreign branches have influential lobbying and media networks capable of drawing attention from organizations like the UN, the European Parliament, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International. They are framing the July uprising as a blow to democracy and a rise of extremism. The effectiveness of this strategy depends on the interim government’s diplomatic skills and how regional powers like India and China respond.

10. The BNP’s Role
Currently, the NCP, which led the July uprising, is demanding that the Awami League be banned and its registration canceled. Jamaat’s stance aligns closely with the NCP, but the BNP has taken a more cautious position. While they support trials for those accused of atrocities during the uprising, they oppose banning political parties outright. Recently, BNP’s senior joint secretary general, Ruhul Kabir Rizvi, said in a press conference that individuals formerly affiliated with the Awami League—but who spoke out against the party’s corruption and were respected in their communities—are welcome to join the BNP. He noted that many were previously unable to do so during periods of repression, but the current environment is more open.

Some believe that if elections remain uncertain or if the BNP and its allies begin street protests, disillusioned grassroots Awami League activists may quietly join forces with them. Yet this, too, depends on the strategy of the Awami League’s top leadership—most of whom are either abroad or in prison. Without clear leadership, it’s unclear who grassroots activists will follow. While local leaders may join the BNP as a survival tactic, it remains uncertain whether this would truly help the Awami League stage an organizational comeback.

Ameen Al Rashid is a journalist and writer.