Is Jamaat's strength in changing colour

No third political force has emerged in Bangladesh after the Awami League and BNP. The Jatiya Party has effectively acted as the Awami League’s B team. Since the July uprising, there have been murmurs in the public sphere that Jamaat-e-Islami might form the next government. The results of student union elections at several public universities appear to hint at that possibility.

It is said that Jamaat’s politics, once nurtured by the BNP, has now outgrown that alliance, and the party is dreaming of capturing power on its own. The 2024 uprising has greatly increased that possibility.

Amidst debates over Jamaat’s potential return to power and what that might mean, Professor Anu Muhammad wrote on Facebook on 18 October: “A popular line is being spread — ‘We’ve already seen the Awami League and BNP; now let’s see Jamaat.’ This claim is factually wrong.”

He wrote: “It is not true that we have not seen Jamaat. A little reflection will remind us that we have seen them only too well. The year 1971 is the greatest example. When the Pakistani military carried out horrific massacres, rapes, torture, arson and looting in this country, Jamaat and all its associated organisations served as their chief collaborators and enjoyed power.”

The academic and activist added: “In the 1980s, under the patronage of the administration, Jamaat’s political and economic structures became strong. They were involved in many incidents of hall takeovers and violence. When Jamaat came to power with the BNP in 2001, two key ministries were in their hands. During their tenure, the Rapid Action Battalion was formed, Adamjee Jute Mills was shut down, militant networks like Bangla Bhai expanded, and extrajudicial killings by the state became widespread.”

The question is: how has a party that sided with the Pakistani military against Bangladesh in the 1971 Liberation War — effectively taking up arms against its own country — managed, half a century after independence, to reach a position where it could return to state power? How did this party become so influential in national politics? And what role did the mainstream or ruling parties of the past play in this process?

Let us look back a little. Because of its opposition to the Liberation War, Jamaat was banned in 1972. But after the political changes following the events of 1975, a military proclamation in 1976 reintroduced religion-based politics, allowing Jamaat to re-enter active politics. When Ziaur Rahman opened the door to multi-party democracy, Jamaat seized the opportunity and gradually consolidated its position in national politics.

After seizing power at gunpoint, Hussain Muhammad Ershad held elections in 1986 to legitimise his rule. The BNP boycotted that election, but the Awami League and its allies joined — with Jamaat also part of that coalition.

In the 1991 election, Jamaat reached an understanding with the BNP and won 18 seats in Parliament. But the BNP–Jamaat relationship did not last. Jamaat later joined the movement led by the Awami League demanding a caretaker government.

Although the Awami League formed the government in 1996, an anti-government movement began within two years — this time, BNP and Jamaat together.

In the 2001 election, Jamaat again allied with the BNP and, for the first time, joined the government. This BNP–Jamaat alliance lasted for many years, though distance gradually grew between them. Differences on many issues became evident, and after last year’s July uprising, their relationship hit rock bottom.

It is often said that Jamaat’s strength comes mainly from the country’s two main parties — the Awami League and the BNP. Jamaat has repeatedly changed its colour to suit the situation. Even before 2001, when it had no cabinet posts, it remained within the power structure in various ways, building a broad business network that made the party financially strong. Yet if the two major parties had not given Jamaat political legitimacy or included it in electoral politics despite its anti-Liberation stance, the idea of Jamaat returning to state power 54 years after independence would never have arisen — nor would its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, have gained dominance in major public university student unions.

The power of changing colour
Jamaat’s adaptability — its so-called “colour changing” — has once again come under discussion amid talk of its growing strength and prospects of returning to power.

Nahid Islam, convenor of the National Citizen Party (NCP) — often described as Jamaat’s “B team” — recently spoke out about Jamaat’s “deception.” On 19 October, he wrote on Facebook: “Jamaat-e-Islami’s so-called PR movement was nothing but a political fraud. It was deliberately designed to derail the Consensus Commission’s reform process and push national dialogue away from reality. The people of Bangladesh can now clearly see through Jamaat’s deception. They will no longer be misled by fake reformists or manipulated actors.”

In response, Jamaat issued a statement calling Nahid’s post “vague and misleading.” The statement said Nahid’s remarks that Jamaat’s PR campaign was fraudulent and political manoeuvring were “utterly false and regrettable,” adding that it was unclear what he meant by such comments.

The question now is: why this rift between Jamaat and the NCP, when many who played leading roles in the July uprising were from Jamaat or its student organisation, Shibir, and when the NCP was believed to have close ties with Jamaat?

An NCP leader told the media that their party wanted the Shapla (water lily) as its electoral symbol. They had long believed the BNP was opposing this. But recently they learned that Jamaat too had objected to the NCP using that symbol. This may have prompted Nahid Islam’s harsh criticism of Jamaat. At the same time, the NCP may now be trying to shed its image as a Jamaat ally and establish an independent political identity.

Hesitation over the July Charter
Political parties, including Jamaat, signed the long-awaited July Charter on 17 October. However, in the run-up to the signing, there was considerable uncertainty about whether Jamaat would sign at all.

After a meeting with the National Consensus Commission on 31 July, the party’s deputy amir, Abdullah Muhammad Taher, told the press that Jamaat would not sign the charter unless it had a legal basis, as there was no guarantee that an elected government would enact it into law. “Whatever needs to be done must be done now,” he said.

On 16 October, a day before the signing, the party’s secretary-general declared that Jamaat would not sign the charter unless it included provisions for proportional representation (PR).

Even on 17 October, the day of the signing, assistant secretary-general Hamidur Rahman Azad told journalists that although they would attend the event, the party had yet to decide whether to sign, since they had not received the implementation draft.

Yet, despite all these conditions, Jamaat eventually signed the July Charter. However, under criticism from the NCP, its leaders later said that if the implementation framework remained unclear, they might withdraw their signatures.

Although Jamaat signed the charter, at a press conference at the National Press Club on 19 October, its secretary-general, Mia Golam Porwar, said that their movement would continue with five demands — including the issuance of an implementation order for the July Charter and the holding of a referendum based on it by November.

The question now is whether Jamaat will remain firm on these demands or, even without a referendum, participate in the national election in February. Will Jamaat contest alone, form an alliance with other Islamic parties, or — as in the past — team up again with the BNP to smooth its way to power?

An understanding with the Awami League?
During the Awami League’s 16 years in power, its harshest persecution fell on the BNP and Jamaat. Many also believe that Jamaat played a significant role, directly and indirectly, in the uprising that led to the fall of the Awami League government. Yet, after the uprising, Jamaat’s amir said the party had forgiven the Awami League government for its repression over the past 16 years.

At an event in Dhaka’s Bijoy Sarani on 3 September last year, the amir declared, “There will be no vengeance against anyone. If anyone seeks justice as a victim, we will assist in ensuring a transparent legal process.”

However, barely a month later, at a Rukon conference in Agargaon on 13 October, he said, “The fallen Awami League must be tried under the same black laws it enacted during its long rule.” Referring to the killings during the student–public uprising, he said, “Justice must be ensured as soon as possible — the Awami League must receive its due.”

On 10 May this year, the day the government banned the Awami League’s activities, the Jamaat amir said, “We demand the trial of fascist killer Hasina and the Awami League. The government must accelerate this trial to restore the nation’s honour.”

There are also allegations that Jamaat is seeking to attract Awami League voters in the upcoming election. Since it is almost certain that the Awami League will not be able to participate, what will its voters do? Will they abstain, or will they vote for another party? If the Jatiya Party is also out, whose ballot boxes will receive the Awami League votes? Jamaat may be trying to capitalise on this vacuum by reassuring local Awami League activists of safety and security — in other words, offering forgiveness on one hand, demanding justice on the other, while allegedly maintaining secret negotiations with the Awami League.

Therefore, if the national election indeed takes place in February, Jamaat’s role will depend entirely on its ability to change colour — whether it contests all 300 seats alone, joins other Islamic parties, or once again forges an alliance with the BNP to pave its way to power.

Amin Al Rashid: Journalist and writer